The Trouble with Common Ground
dc.contributor.author | Koschmann, Timothy | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-06-06T13:06:32Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-06-06T13:06:32Z | |
dc.date.issued | 42644 | |
dc.description.abstract | Tenenberg, Roth and Socha ( 2016 ) documents interaction within a paired programming task. The analysis rests on a conceptualization the authors term “We-awareness.” “We-awareness”, in turn, builds on Tomasello’s notion of “shared intentionality” and through it, upon Clark’s formulation of Common Ground (CG). In this commentary I review the features of CG. I attempt to show that neither Tomasello’s ( 2014 ) notion of “shared intentionality” nor Clark’s ( 1996 ) model of CG-shared develop an adequate treatment of the sequential emergence of subjective meaning. This is a critical problem for CG and other conceptualizations that build upon it (e.g., “shared intentionality”, “We-awareness”). And it calls into question their usefulness for building an analytic apparatus for studying mutual awareness at the worksite. I suggest that Schütz’s ( 1953 ) model of “motive coordination” might serve as a better starting place. | de |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10606-016-9245-x | |
dc.identifier.pissn | 1573-7551 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10606-016-9245-x | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://dl.eusset.eu/handle/20.500.12015/3846 | |
dc.publisher | Springer | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW): Vol. 25 | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) | |
dc.subject | awareness | |
dc.subject | Schütz | |
dc.subject | shared intentionality | |
dc.subject | Tomasello | |
dc.title | The Trouble with Common Ground | de |
dc.type | Text/Journal Article | |
gi.citation.endPage | 311 | |
gi.citation.startPage | 303 |