The Trouble with Common Ground

dc.contributor.authorKoschmann, Timothy
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-06T13:06:32Z
dc.date.available2020-06-06T13:06:32Z
dc.date.issued42644
dc.description.abstractTenenberg, Roth and Socha ( 2016 ) documents interaction within a paired programming task. The analysis rests on a conceptualization the authors term “We-awareness.” “We-awareness”, in turn, builds on Tomasello’s notion of “shared intentionality” and through it, upon Clark’s formulation of Common Ground (CG). In this commentary I review the features of CG. I attempt to show that neither Tomasello’s ( 2014 ) notion of “shared intentionality” nor Clark’s ( 1996 ) model of CG-shared develop an adequate treatment of the sequential emergence of subjective meaning. This is a critical problem for CG and other conceptualizations that build upon it (e.g., “shared intentionality”, “We-awareness”). And it calls into question their usefulness for building an analytic apparatus for studying mutual awareness at the worksite. I suggest that Schütz’s ( 1953 ) model of “motive coordination” might serve as a better starting place.de
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10606-016-9245-x
dc.identifier.pissn1573-7551
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10606-016-9245-x
dc.identifier.urihttps://dl.eusset.eu/handle/20.500.12015/3846
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.relation.ispartofComputer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW): Vol. 25
dc.relation.ispartofseriesComputer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW)
dc.subjectawareness
dc.subjectSchütz
dc.subjectshared intentionality
dc.subjectTomasello
dc.titleThe Trouble with Common Groundde
dc.typeText/Journal Article
gi.citation.endPage311
gi.citation.startPage303

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